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Three Years Under the PIPEDA:
A Disappointing Beginning
By Christopher Berzins†

Introduction

the Federal Court level. There have also been public
statements from the Commissioner’s office with respect
to policy directions and compliance issues, and the emergence of some critical commentary concerning oversight
and enforcement issues. 11 Therefore, even allowing for
the uncertainties already noted, there is now enough
experience with administration of the legislation to
permit a reassessment of my previous criticisms.
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s of January 1, 2004, after a three-year phase-in
period, the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act 1 (PIPEDA) came fully into
force. Although considerable uncertainty currently
prevails due to unanticipated events such as the resignation and replacement of Commissioner George
Radwanski 2 and the late constitutional challenge by
Quebec, 3 there is now sufficient experience with the
legislation to begin to assess how the PIPEDA is working.
It is also a timely juncture to do so with the extension of
the legislation to the provincially regulated private
sector. 4
Several years ago I strongly criticized the oversight
and enforcement approach that underpins the PIPEDA. 5
My criticisms were two-fold. First, I argued that the
PIPEDA placed excessive reliance on complaint resolution as a means of protecting personal information, and
that for a number of reasons, this might not be the most
effective means of achieving regulatory compliance, particularly in a privacy context. Second, I suggested that the
Privacy Commissioner and the Federal Court were particularly weak choices as the primary institutions responsible for oversight and enforcement: the former by
nature an ombudsman limited to the power to make
recommendations, and the latter a generalist body with
no claim to privacy expertise. I argued that these shortcomings, along with the cost and delay inherent in the
mandatory two-step process that requires complainants
to go first to the Commissioner and then to the courts, 6
could undermine privacy protection by frustrating complainants and rewarding non-compliance.
The criticisms I advanced were based primarily on a
critique of the policy process that produced the PIPEDA 7
and on the perceived shortcomings of the oversight and
enforcement mechanisms that were selected. 8 At the
time, there was little in the way of findings by the Commissioner and nothing from the Federal Court. 9 That is
no longer the case; by the end of 2003, the Commissioner had concluded over 250 complaint investigations 10 and a number of complaints had proceeded to

Unfortunately, developments thus far appear to
confirm the concerns I expressed about the weaknesses
of the PIPEDA’s oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
The PIPEDA’s emphasis on complaint resolution has
been clearly borne out in practice with little in the way
of systemic and proactive approaches to privacy compliance. In addition, very few complaints have made it to
the Federal Court, and those that have been filed have
moved extremely slowly, the result being that there is
very little sense of how the courts will shape the legislation. Not only does this create tremendous uncertainty,
but it suggests that delay may become a fundamental
aspect of the compliance environment, to the obvious
detriment of complainants.
The experience over the first three years suggests
that there are at least four fundamental problems with
oversight and enforcement of the PIPEDA. First is the
heavy emphasis on complaint resolution. Not only are
there serious questions about the effectiveness of complaint investigations as a tool for promoting privacy compliance, but it appears that complaint resolution within
the PIPEDA framework is making cost, delay, and uncertainty significant considerations for all parties. Second,
the Privacy Commissioner’s office has neglected to utilise
those provisions in the PIPEDA that promote proactive
and systemic approaches to privacy compliance, thereby
failing to employ the entire ‘‘privacy toolkit’’. 12 Third,
there has been a disturbing lack of transparency with
respect to the Privacy Commissioner’s compliance initiatives. This has been most evident with the all but categorical refusal to reveal the names of complaint respondents, 13 which has a number of unfortunate results. It
greatly undercuts the instructive value that complaint
investigations might have, it deprives compliant institu-

†M.A., LL.B., LL.M., Manager of the Freedom of Information Office, Ontario Ministry of Labour. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and are not intended to represent those of the Ministry of Labour. I am grateful to Murray Long who generously shared a number of his files with me
and provided extremely helpful comments on an earlier paper dealing with the PIPEDA.
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tions of the recognition they deserve, it unjustly rewards
non-compliant parties, it penalizes consumers who are
unable to make informed privacy decisions, it prevents
the market from rewarding or penalizing organizations
based on the public’s awareness of privacy practices, and
it makes it extremely difficult to assess not only the
extent of compliance with the PIPEDA, but also the
effectiveness of the Commissioner’s office in promoting
compliance. Finally, uncertainty is becoming a central
feature of oversight and enforcement of the PIPEDA.
While this stems in part from unresolved issues such as
Quebec’s constitutional challenge, ‘‘substantially similar’’
determinations concerning provincial private-sector privacy statutes, 14 and the uncertainty about whether provinces such as Ontario will introduce their own privatesector privacy legislation, 15 it also derives from the Privacy Commissioner’s compliance strategies. The pronounced emphasis on complaint resolution means that
there will not be a full understanding of the nature of
the PIPEDA regime until there has been a comprehensive treatment of the Act’s provisions at the appellate
level of the Federal Court. As a result, for quite some
time, complainants will be unclear about their prospects
for success, the Commissioner’s office cannot be confident about the directions it has charted, and organizations will be confused about the nature and extent of
their privacy obligations.
This article will consider these four problems in
greater detail and will assess the extent to which they are
primarily structural, in the sense that they are the result
of previous legislative choices, or are more the product of
compliance strategies adopted by the Commissioner’s
office.
To the extent that they result from the former, the
possibilities for change are limited, aside from a full overhaul of the PIPEDA. However, if they are the product of
policy choices in the Commissioner’s office, one can be
more sanguine. The appointment of a new Commissioner provides a distinct opportunity for a change in
direction, signs of which are already clearly in evidence. 16
The enactment of provincial statutes that satisfy the
PIPEDA’s ‘‘substantially similar’’ test could also drive
change at the federal level, and here, too, there have been
hints that this could occur. 17 Whether the opportunities
for change are realised will be pivotal if there is to be
effective privacy protection throughout the private
sector.

from a compliance perspective is another matter. Not
only are there significant problems associated with complaint-based enforcement systems in general, 19 but there
is good reason to think that they may be exacerbated in
a privacy setting. A brief consideration of these issues is
helpful to understand more fully the implications of
relying primarily on a complaint-based approach to privacy compliance.

Resolving Complaints — Promoting
Compliance?

Complaint-based enforcement can also be criticized
in terms of the rules that it generates. First, the narrowing
of issues that tends to occur in complaint-based systems
arguably produces informational deficiencies that
undercut the substantive foundation for complaintbased rules. Second, complaint-based rules are not
always clearly stated, frequently buried in or qualified by
the particular facts of the case. Third, agency policy as a
whole often must be extracted from what is sometimes

C

olin Bennett has noted that the PIPEDA ‘‘gives the
impression that the most important responsibilities
of the Commissioner . . . relate to complaints investigation and redress.’’ 18 In fact, it is clear that complaint
resolution is at the heart of the PIPEDA’s approach to
oversight and enforcement. Whether this makes sense

It is not always fully appreciated that in complaintbased enforcement, complaint resolution becomes the
primary vehicle through which the oversight agency
develops policy. Agency policy arises from the accumulation of adjudicatory rules that are developed in the
course of resolving specific disputes. This means that
there are two aspects of complaint-based policy development that deserve attention. The first consideration is
the nature of the process that produces the rules that
coalesce into agency policy, and the second concern is
the rules themselves and how they are communicated to
the wider community.
From a process perspective, complaint resolution
tends to be driven by the parties to the dispute rather
than by the oversight agency. As a result, the agency’s
agenda and policy development become both reactive
and dependent, dictated primarily by the nature of the
complaints that are advanced. Moreover, there is a real
danger that complaint-based systems of enforcement
may not function at all if individuals fail to complain or
if the complaints are of poor quality. 20 Second, the complaint resolution process will be confined largely to the
parties to the dispute. In many instances, they will control how the issues are framed and what information is
placed before the oversight agency. There is a strong
likelihood that this will result in a narrowing of issues
and information under consideration, which may not
advance the interests of the regulated community at
large. 21 Third, policy development that occurs by way of
complaint resolution can be both costly and unfair to
the wider community. It is costly because it results in
retrospective rule changes that affect not just the immediate parties to the complaint, and it is unfair because
most of the affected parties will not have had an opportunity to influence the outcome. And finally, even
though lack of complaints can be an issue, complaintbased enforcement systems are also particularly susceptible to overload. 22 This can result in delay for complainants, uncertainty for the wider community, and resource
allocation issues for the oversight agency.

Three Years Under the PIPEDA: A Disappointing Beginning
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dense jurisprudence that may be anything but accessible
to the wider community. And when the rules change
through complaint resolution, the result may be ‘‘wealth
transfers’’ 23 affecting the losing party and the broader
community as well. In short, complaint-based rules often
make it difficult for many parties to plan their behaviour
with a clear understanding of what their obligations may
be.
The general criticisms of complaint-based enforcement systems apply with particular force to privacy compliance, several warranting special mention. First, there is
good reason to think that the effectiveness of complaints
as an enforcement mechanism is greatly undermined in
a privacy context because many individuals who may be
affected by problematic privacy practices never become
aware of the misuse of their personal information. Most
individuals will have no idea that information concerning them may have been improperly shared within
or between organizations and, therefore, will never be in
a position to make a complaint. 24 Where an improper
use of personal information does come to an individual’s
attention, it still may be difficult to identify the responsible party. 25 For example, problems arising from erroneous credit information may be difficult to trace back
to the source. And in many instances where the impact
of an improper privacy practice is in the nature of a
minor annoyance rather than a serious, quantifiable
harm, it may not seem worth the individual’s time and
effort to file a formal complaint, even though the cumulative effect of the practice may be significant when
numerous individuals are affected in a similar manner.
All of these factors reduce the effectiveness of privacy
complaints as a mechanism for advancing privacy compliance.
While a failure to complain may undermine the
effectiveness of complaint-based privacy compliance,
there is also the converse problem that the system may
become overloaded by complaints that are idiosyncratic
or frivolous. As a result, even though they do not raise
issues of systemic interest, they still consume scarce
administrative resources. A review of the complaint
investigations completed under the PIPEDA through the
first three years suggests that we may be seeing both of
these factors at play. Although relatively few complaints
raising serious systemic issues have been filed by individuals directly affected in a personal capacity, 26 there have
been any number of complaints that appear relatively
trivial and perhaps even vexatious in nature. 27
It was suggested that complaint-based systems tend
to confine both the issues and the information that are
placed before the oversight agency. This is very much the
case with privacy complaints. The personal nature of
some of the issues certainly contributes to this, with
issues frequently being framed narrowly to protect the
complainant’s privacy. Often, complainants will want to
focus on their particular circumstances, the respondent
organisation will want to avoid broader scrutiny of its
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information management practices (unless it believes
that a practice that has been implicated is consistent
with industry-wide standards), 28 and the oversight
agency will want to manage the scope of the issues
under review given the demand on its resources and the
pressure to close files in a timely manner.
Some of the factors that force a narrowing of the
issues under consideration in a privacy context also contribute to the lack of visibility that often attaches to the
results of privacy investigations. For example, the Privacy
Commissioner has relied almost exclusively on fully
anonymized summaries of complaint-investigation
results after initial indications that investigation results
would not be released at all. 29 However, to the extent
that complaint investigations are used by privacy commissioners as vehicles for establishing and communicating privacy rules, limiting their availability undermines their effectiveness, a point clearly recognised by
British Columbia Commissioner David Loukidelis, who
has already announced that he intends to make complaint investigation reports issued under the Personal
Information Protection Act available in their entirety. 30
Given both the general and the privacy-specific concerns with complaint-based enforcement, there have to
be serious reservations about the extent to which oversight and enforcement of the PIPEDA relies on complaint resolution. Not only does the Act clearly revolve
around the investigation and adjudication of complaints,
but enforcement responsibilities were assigned to two
bodies that were heavily complaint-oriented in focus: the
Federal Court by design but the Privacy Commissioner
by choice, long viewed by leading privacy advocates as a
primarily reactive, complaint-driven body. 31 And under
Commissioner Radwanski, the office’s complaint orientation intensified with an emphasis on ‘‘building numbers’’ 32 in order to support requests for resources, a concern that was reflected in the inflation of complaint
numbers by including non-jurisdictional findings and
relatively minor failures to comply with the 30-day time
limit for responding to requests for personal information. 33
Aside from the complaint orientation of both the
statute and the oversight and enforcement bodies, the
PIPEDA establishes an extremely unwieldy complaint
process that requires individuals to proceed first to the
Commissioner’s office, and then to Federal Court if dissatisfied with the outcome.
Given that the Commissioner can only make recommendations, even if satisfied that the legislation has
been breached, and that remedial relief is confined to
the court, the potential for cost and delay to complainants is significant. This is compounded by the fact that
an application to the court involves essentially a
rehearing on the merits. As was suggested by the Public
Interest Advocacy Centre and the Consumer Association
of Canada, ‘‘[o]rganizations wishing to push the limits of
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the legislative regime can do so in the comfortable
knowledge that only the most determined and financially able individuals will pursue them in court’’. 34 In
addition to cost and delay to complainants, the PIPEDA’s
complaint process also undercuts the precedent value of
Commissioner’s findings, given that the Federal Court
has ultimate responsibility for fleshing out the statute.
And because of the protracted complaint process that is
likely to discourage many complainants, it may be quite
some time before we have a clear understanding of how
the PIPEDA’s provisions will be interpreted, a point that
will be considered at greater length. Suffice it to say that
the PIPEDA’s complaint provisions invite prolonged
uncertainty rather than providing necessary guidance to
the wider community.

Complaint Resolution — The
Results Thus Far
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G

iven the heavy reliance on complaint resolution,
some comment is in order with respect to the complaint investigations concluded in the first three years.
What is immediately apparent is that a full and fair
assessment of the Commissioner’s findings is not possible, given that the complete investigation results are
not available. The Commissioner’s office has chosen to
release short investigation summaries and, in all but one
case, the summaries have been anonymised. That being
said, a review of the investigations concluded through
2003 indicates that in most cases, the conclusions are
supported by the facts and there are few results that
might be viewed as contentious. 35 However, there is very
little substance to many of the summaries, and there are
a number of significant findings that deserve far more
attention than they appear to have received. As a case in
point, a number of investigation summaries dealing with
significant workplace privacy issues provide little sense of
what considerations weighed most heavily in the outcome. 36 If complaints are to serve as a meaningful way of
providing parties with direction and guidance, it is vitally
important that this information be made available.
In assessing the PIPEDA’s first year, Colin Bennett
expressed disappointment with the overall quality of the
complaints that had been initiated. 37 A review of the 255
summaries through 2003 suggests that this is still a real
concern. There are relatively few complaints that raise
major systemic issues, and a number of those that do
have been filed by advocates intentionally challenging
particular practices such as the use of personal information for secondary marketing purposes. 38 However, it
may well be that in a complaint-focused system, this will
be one of the few tools that can be employed to ensure
that systemic issues are fully canvassed, there being the
added advantage that the full investigation results may
become available to the community at large. 39 The
majority of complaints continue to be very narrow in
focus and the conclusions one can draw are greatly lim-
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ited by the removal of identifiers. For example, a particular organization might be the subject of a number of
complaints that, considered separately, appear to be
simply inadvertent mistakes. However, viewed together,
the picture might change and more critical conclusions
might be drawn with respect to the extent of the organization’s concern for the careful management of personal
information. 40
It is both puzzling and frustrating that in a complaint-based system where precedent often plays a large
role in deciding future cases and in informing the wider
community, the Commissioner’s office refuses to provide
anything more than anonymised case summaries. The
reliance on complaint summaries prevents parties from
obtaining a detailed understanding of the approach
taken by the Commissioner in individual cases, and the
problem is exacerbated by the refusal to link investigation findings to other cases involving similar issues,
including investigations involving the very same respondent. 41 This seems to be an attempt by the Commissioner’s office to ensure that its position concerning the
identification of complaint respondents is not undermined, an issue that will be considered at greater length.
Unfortunately, the result is that investigation summaries
are far less useful than they could be, a point that would
be less important if complaint resolution was not viewed
by the Commissioner’s office as the primary vehicle for
developing policy and promoting compliance.
The current emphasis on complaint resolution to
administer the PIPEDA is clearly grounded in the legislation and in the decision to rely on oversight and enforcement bodies that were largely complaint-driven in outlook, but the Commissioner’s enforcement strategies
have reinforced complaint-resolution tendencies. At the
same time, aspects of these strategies have ensured that
complaint resolution is far less effective than it might be.
A number of factors appear to be at work. The first is an
overly cautious reading of the PIPEDA by the Commissioner’s office in terms of what is permissible with
respect to the identification of complaint respondents. 42
Second is an excessive concern that some leverage must
be retained with respect to bad actors. 43 This clearly
derives from the fundamental weakness of the
ombudsman model; given that an ombudsman can only
recommend, this places a premium on the power of
publicity that the Commissioner’s office has guarded as if
it were a precious commodity. The danger is that in
reserving it for the most serious cases, it ends up never
being used. At the same time, some of the potential
benefits of complaint investigations are lost. That being
said, these are matters that can be revisited and there is
already ample evidence that the new Commissioner is
far more receptive to the concerns of the privacy community than was her predecessor. If so, there is the possibility that the present emphasis on complaint resolution
could be reduced and the policies that undermine its
effectiveness reconsidered.

Three Years Under the PIPEDA: A Disappointing Beginning

Using the Entire Privacy Toolbox

T
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he oversight and enforcement thrust of the PIPEDA
is clearly complaint-oriented, but that is by no
means the only approach to privacy compliance contemplated by the legislation. Under section 24 of the Act, the
Commissioner is provided with some very significant
compliance tools, which include public education,
research, and working with organizations to develop privacy codes and guidelines. In addition, section 18
authorises the Commissioner to conduct an audit of an
organization’s personal information practices where
there are ‘‘reasonable grounds to believe’’ that the organization is not complying with the Act. Finally, the Commissioner has the power of publicity, not only as a part
of the annual report to Parliament, but also pursuant to
section 20, which allows for disclosure of an organization’s personal information management practices where
the Commissioner ‘‘considers that it is in the public
interest to do so.’’
In the first three years under the PIPEDA, these tools
were scarcely employed. In terms of the Commissioner’s
powers under section 24, education was limited for the
most part to high-level speeches by Commissioner
Radwanski with little in the way of concrete direction; as
Interim Commissioner Marleau acknowledged, the
office was ‘‘reluctant to issue guidelines’’ even though it
recognised an appetite for this within the regulated community. 44 And, until very recently, 45 there was little
emphasis on PIPEDA-specific research; certainly nothing
that was made publicly available. Perhaps of most importance, there is no evidence of any concerted effort to
actively engage the regulated community with respect to
the development of guidelines or codes of practice. This
point is made abundantly clear by Case Summary #167,
an important complaint dealing with consent to disclose
personal information for marketing purposes. After
making a number of specific recommendations to
improve the respondent organization’s consent procedures, the Commissioner then recommended that the
respondent present those same recommendations to the
Canadian Marketing Association and ‘‘ convey his expectation that all CMA members will quickly adopt them ’’
(emphasis added). 46 One might have expected that the
Commissioner would have been quick to seize a chance
to interact directly with the broader community on an
issue of significant import. Instead, the opportunity was
passed up, and in a manner that could only serve to
alienate rather than enlist the support of the CMA. 47
With respect to the Commissioner’s section 18
audit powers, they have not yet been used, the view
being that, as yet, there have not been sufficient grounds
to do so. 48 Given some of the investigations that have
been concluded, especially in 2003, there have to be
some concerns about what it may take to trigger an
audit. It is now apparent that there are repeat ‘‘offenders’’
including one case in which the Commissioner
expressed concern that previous recommendations were
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not acted upon. 49 This would certainly appear to provide
sufficient basis for proceeding under section 18. 50 However, it may mean that as with the power to publicize a
respondent’s identity, the power to audit becomes one
that is held in abeyance. If so, this would be unfortunate
given the value assigned to privacy audits by a number of
privacy experts, Bennett and Flaherty in particular. 51
Finally, as should be clear by now, the power to
publicize has, with one exception, simply not been exercised either in the context of the annual reports or in the
reporting of individual complaint investigation findings.
And given that the audit power has not yet been
employed, there has been no issue of publicity in this
context.
There are at least three significant concerns with
respect to the Privacy Commissioner’s seeming reluctance to employ any compliance tools much apart from
complaint resolution. First, the Commissioner’s office is
short-changing itself because there is good reason to
think that successful oversight and enforcement, particularly in a privacy context, depends upon utilising effectively all of the available administrative tools. Second, the
price of overemphasizing complaint investigations is a
neglect of proactive and systemic approaches that are
likely to be far more effective in terms of building in
privacy from the ‘‘bottom up’’. 52 Third, the Commissioner’s office is depriving itself of the opportunity to
engage the community, a step that is vitally important in
terms of engendering a vested interest in making the
legislation work. These three concerns overlap and interrelate, but each merits special attention.
With respect to the failure to utilise all the oversight
and enforcement mechanisms the legislation provides,
Colin Bennett has noted that ‘‘it is not entirely clear that
the OPC fully recognises that successful privacy protection depends on using the entire repertoire of possible
policy instruments for the protection of privacy.’’ 53 Bennett has always been a strong proponent of using the
‘‘entire toolbox’’, especially some of the ‘‘softer’’ privacy
tools such as education, given its importance in producing ‘‘organizational change and learning’’. 54 There are
other privacy commissioners who share Bennett’s views.
For example, Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian, has actively encouraged a
variety of education and research initiatives involving
other commissioners, other jurisdictions, and privatesector organizations. 55 She has also been an enthusiastic
advocate of innovative tools such as privacy-enhancing
technologies. And British Columbia’s Commissioner,
David Loukidelis, has clearly advanced a strong case for
using a wide range of tools, such as guidelines and
advance rulings to assist and educate the community. 56
Although the Privacy Commissioner’s office has
demonstrated little interest in many of the compliance
instruments that might complement complaint resolution, there have been some recent signs that this may
change. For instance, Interim Commissioner Marleau
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indicated that there was greater willingness to consider
the development of guidelines, a shift that appears to be
fully supported by Commissioner Stoddart. 57 Another
particularly positive indication of change in the Commissioner’s office is the announcement of the formation
of an advisory panel of outside experts. 58 The mere fact
that it includes David Flaherty is significant, given his
views on the importance of tools such as site visits and
his critical reservations concerning the value of complaint investigations. 59 There is also the recently
announced Contributions program, 60 designed to promote privacy-focused research. Finally, Commissioner
Stoddart’s demonstrated willingness to engage and collaborate with the privacy community provides a strong
indication that her office may be prepared to be more
creative with respect to the means by which it promotes
compliance with the PIPEDA.
In addition to failing to draw on all of the compliance tools that are at the Privacy Commissioner’s disposal, the reliance on complaint resolution also means
that there is a neglect of proactive and systemic
approaches to privacy compliance. As discussed already,
complaint investigations are inherently reactive, which
has an impact on how an oversight body can develop
policy. Although there may be some latitude to expand
the scope of a complaint investigation, this will be limited by other considerations; in particular, statutory time
limits. 61 And even though a complaint investigation may
be widened, there is still a dependence on the actual
complaints that are brought forward. Without ‘‘quality’’
complaints, the oversight body may have no opportunity
to explore systemic concerns, even if it is inclined to do
so.
As noted, the PIPEDA does provide the Commissioner with a number of tools that involve approaches
that are proactive, systemic, or both. The two most
important are assisting organizations to develop privacy
codes or guidelines and the power to conduct section 18
audits. The former is clearly a tool that is both proactive
and systemic in outlook. The latter is systemic in nature,
although it is triggered largely by reactive considerations
in that the Commissioner must have some basis for
believing that the legislation is not being complied with,
a determination that as a practical matter is most likely
to arise from complaint investigation findings. As indicated already, neither of these tools has been employed
by the Commissioner’s office to date.
With respect to the development of codes or guidelines, there is already an extremely solid foundation for
proceeding further, given the extent to which voluntary
codes have taken root in Canada. Bennett, who has long
emphasized the general importance of the Canadian
code-building experience, 62 has suggested in the context
of the PIPEDA that:
. . . there is clearly a need for greater collaboration with those
associations who have already developed codes of practice. It
seems rather counterproductive for rules about direct-marketing, for example, to emerge slowly and pragmatically
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from the accumulation of findings in response to complaints. Surely, the staff of the Commissioner’s office and the
Direct Marketing Association (DMA) can get together to
figure out a consistent interpretation of the rules for notification, consent, access and so on. 63

The use of collaborative processes to produce ‘‘rules’’ to
guide the wider community is an approach with considerable merit, 64 but there are reasons that can disincline
some agencies from proceeding in this manner. First is
cost, particularly as one moves towards more full-blown
consultative processes. Second, even though proponents
often laud the benefits of consultation-based guidelines,
it can be difficult to demonstrate clearly the benefits. In
fact, there may even be a perverse disincentive at work.
From a narrow, short-term perspective, it may be in an
agency’s interest to focus on complaints. They are far
more measurable and can be used to demonstrate both
effectiveness and the need for resources. Conversely, if
proactive initiatives are too successful and, as a result,
reduce the number of complaints filed, this may serve to
undercut the agency’s position. Finally, there is an issue
of style; participative processes depend on open, constructive dialogue, and where this is absent, the likelihood of engaging the community is reduced. 65
Nonetheless, there are indications that a number of
commissioners are receptive to collaborative approaches.
David Loukidelis is probably in the forefront in terms of
advocating persuasively for the use of guidelines and
rulings informed by community participation. 66 And, as
noted, Ann Cavoukian’s office has worked with a
number of private-sector parties on initiatives designed
to provide guidance and assistance to the community,
the best example being its recent collaborative effort
with the CMA on the application of fair information
principles to customer relationship management
(CRM). 67 Finally, there are suggestions that that the federal Privacy Commissioner could move in this direction
as well. As noted earlier, there now appears to be a
recognition that the community wants direction and
guidance from the Commissioner’s office, and there are
indications that this may be forthcoming. Of particular
note is Commissioner Stoddart’s recent speech to the
CMA in which she referred explicitly to working as
‘‘partners’’ to ‘‘eliminate practices that do not respect fair
information principles’’. 68 On its own, this might not
seem especially noteworthy, but compared with the
approach of Commissioner Radwanski evidenced in
Case Summary #167, discussed earlier, it does signify an
important change in tone and direction.
Finally, there is the issue of engaging the broader
community in the sense of enlisting its support in
ensuring that the legislation works. It has been said of
James Landis, perhaps the leading proponent of the
effectiveness of the administrative process 69 and one of
its most successful architects and administrators, that he
fully appreciated the importance of using all available
tools to ensure that all parties had a vested interest in
making the legislation work. As Thomas McCraw has
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noted ‘‘. . . Landis persistently emphasized the necessity
of using all the incentives potentially inherent in the
industry [securities regulation] to give every person
involved — executive, accountant, broker, banker — a
stake in helping to enforce the law’’. 70
There are positive signs that a number of privacy
commissioners appreciate the need to engage the community in collaborative compliance-related initiatives.
For example, Commissioner Loukidelis has said, ‘‘. . . it is
crucial to the law’s success that the oversight body be
constantly in touch with and open to approaches by all
affected constituencies. Regulators, after all, do not have
a monopoly on expertise or wisdom, so ongoing input
from those involved is a good thing’’. 71
An excellent example of enlisting community participation in support of the compliance undertaking is
the collaboration between the CMA and Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner with respect to customer relationship management. As the joint CMA-IPC
paper concludes:
Businesses should view privacy as a tool for ensuring that
CRM initiatives succeed. This can be achieved by building
fair information practices into CRM, with a particular
emphasis on being open and transparent with customers. In
short, privacy is good for CRM and can help companies to
gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace by
building strong customer relationships based on a foundation of trust. 72

And a similar theme was expressed by Commissioner
Stoddart when she urged the CMA to work with her to
eliminate marketing practices that harmed the CMA and
its members because they did not adhere to recognised
privacy principles. 73
In short, there now seems to be a much a greater
appreciation of the need for privacy commissioners to
rely on all of the privacy tools that are at their disposal, to
place more emphasis on approaches to compliance that
build in privacy at the front end from the bottom up,
and to engage the broader community by convincing
key participants that they have a vested interest in
making the legislation work. The most encouraging
developments are at the federal level where previously
just the opposite had been the case. That being said, one
must be cautiously optimistic because there are some
still some issues where change is not yet evident. A good
example is the identification of complaint respondents,
to which we now turn.

Naming Names

U

ntil recently, many of the Privacy Commissioner’s
activities with respect to enforcement of the
PIPEDA were not as transparent as they might be. From
the outset, the Commissioner’s office all but refused to
disclose the names of complaint respondents and would
only release complaint investigation summaries, having
contemplated initially not releasing any investigation
details. In addition, the office was less than forthcoming
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with respect to disclosure of compliance-related data. 74
However, with Commissioner Radwanski’s departure,
matters appear to be changing and there is clear evidence that a more far more open environment has
emerged. 75 That being said, on the issue of identifying
complainant respondents, there has been no movement,
even though Commissioner Stoddart has been strongly
urged to reconsider the refusal to do so. 76
The Commissioner’s office appears to have three
main objections to the suggestion that complaint respondents should be named. First, the Commissioner’s office
has resisted naming names because it does not feel that it
should be in the business of ‘‘punishing’’ organizations. 77
Second, it has argued that the power of publicity needs
to be reserved for the most serious cases of non-compliance. 78 Third, it has claimed that the wording of section 20 of the PIPEDA does not allow for the identification of organizations in all cases and that the
determination of the ‘‘public interest in disclosure’’ must
be done on a complaint-by-complaint basis. 79 Before
considering the case that can be made for identifying
complaint respondents, several comments are in order
with respect to the reasons advanced by the Commissioner’s office for limited disclosure.
First, the notion that publicity can be equated with
punishment is highly questionable. It only makes sense if
the starting assumption is that identities should normally
be protected, with disclosure the exception. However,
there has been no principled argument advanced to support that proposition. 80 Aside from that, the direct correlation between publicity and punishment is not sustainable. Properly speaking, publicity is more about
informing the wider community and this, of course, may
have consequences, both positive and negative, for
affected organizations. Subsequent consumer choices
may have an adverse impact, but characterizing this as
punishment misstates the issue. Moreover, as should be
readily apparent, in many cases, publicity will be to an
organization’s benefit where its compliance efforts are
praised by the Commissioner. 81
With respect to the suggestion that the power of
publicity must be reserved for the most serious cases of
non-compliant behaviour, this is really little more than a
candid admission that an ombudsman is severely constrained in terms of the leverage it can assert with respect
to non-compliant actors. Rationing the use of a scarce
asset to address this shortcoming may actually be
counterproductive in the long-run, aside from the other
costs it entails. Between a policy of publicizing a respondent’s identity in most situations and one holding out
the mere possibility of disclosure if the conduct is sufficiently egregious, it is not hard to decide which would
have the greater deterrent effect. 82 The choice becomes
even more one-sided when one factors in general community awareness that, in practice, the standard for disclosure has almost never been met.
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Finally, the suggestion that a broader disclosure
policy is simply not mandated by the language of the
PIPEDA is not compelling. There appears to be a leap in
logic where the Commissioner’s office reads the public
interest standard in section 20 to require a case-by-case
consideration. Quite simply, this seems to be an unnecessarily constricted view of the scope of the section 20
powers. One may grant that the wording of section 20
contemplates something less than disclosure in every
case, but that does not mean that the public interest
must be read to mean only in the most exceptional
circumstances — which is definitely the result under
current practice. In that respect, it is extremely difficult
to understand how the public interest test for identifying
complaint respondents could only be satisfied in one out
of the 255 case summaries issued for the first three years.
In addition, the Commissioner’s office does not appear
to have made any attempt to develop criteria to flesh out
the public interest test, 83 and here there is considerable
room for movement given that some of those pushing
for greater disclosure recognise that identifying complaint respondents in every instance is not essential. 84 A
certain number of complaints simply do not raise issues
of particular concern to the broader community, and
publicizing in these circumstances would produce minimal returns. There might also be situations in which
disclosure of the organization’s identity might compromise a complainant’s privacy rights. After that, however,
there are a number of situations in which disclosure
would be very much in the public interest. Examples
include complaints having broad systemic implications
(e.g., opt-out policies), complaints involving repeat
offenders, including failures to respond to previous recommendations, and investigations that reveal ‘‘exemplary’’ 85 practices on the part of respondent organizations. More preferable would be a general
acknowledgment that the public interest favours greater
disclosure, especially in the context of a new regime
where the community is looking for guidance, but there
is considerable room to develop a set of public interest
criteria that would permit much broader disclosure than
occurs presently. This takes us to the positive case for
disclosure.
The argument for greater disclosure of the identity
of complaint respondents has a number of strands that
can be grouped around four main themes: fairness,
market efficiency, promoting compliance, and accountability and oversight. Some of these arguments overlap
and it is possible to frame an issue in a variety of ways.
For instance, access to information can be considered as
an issue of fairness, as a market efficiency question, as a
compliance concern, and as a matter of oversight and
accountability.
From a fairness perspective, there are several propositions that can be advanced. First, as a matter of fairness, consumers should be entitled to make wellinformed decisions on matters affecting them, which
means giving them as much relevant information as pos-
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sible. Second, it is only fair that organizations that are
complying with the legislation have their efforts
recognised. 86 Third, it is unfair to allow non-compliant
organizations to shield themselves behind anonymized
reports.
With respect to market efficiency, it has always been
argued that markets function best when consumers are
fully informed. When they lack critical information, they
cannot make informed choices. Linked to this is the idea
that informed choices will reward organizations that
invest in privacy protection. This in turn will encourage
other organizations to make similar investments. Conversely, non-compliant organizations will be penalized to
the extent that informed consumers elect to shift their
business to organizations that have privacy-friendly practices.
Anonymized reports also undermine compliance
efforts. On one hand, they discourage compliance
because non-compliant firms are able to avoid critical
scrutiny. When experience shows that organizations are
almost never identified, the most intransigent can carry
on reasonably secure in the knowledge that the public
will remain unaware that their privacy practices are deficient. Perhaps just as troubling is that in grey areas, anonymity may encourage some organizations to take privacy-invasive risks rather than erring on the side of
privacy protection. The converse problem is that the
public does not have access to valuable information
about exemplary practices. Aside from the benefits that
ought to accrue to such organizations, other organizations are being denied an opportunity to study and apply
what are recognised to be best practices. This is especially
important if the oversight agency itself is reluctant to
provide specific guidance to the community.
Finally, it is almost impossible to make informed
assessments about how the system is functioning when
investigation findings are anonymised. For example, even
though there are now over 100 investigations involving
banks, we have no idea how the different banks compare. We do not know to what extent the complaints are
distributed evenly across the banking sector, or whether
there are some particularly poor performers with
numerous complaints. One senses that the latter may be
the case, but confirmation is lacking. 87 One can only
expect this to become more of a problem as complaint
findings with respect to the provincially regulated private
sector begin to appear. Anonymised reports also prevent
one from making fully informed assessments of the
Commissioner’s findings. For example, where an organization’s privacy policies are in issue, knowing which
organization is involved would give others a much better
sense of the basis for the Commissioner’s findings. This
in turn would allow for a more informed critique of the
Commissioner’s handling of complaints, something that
at this point is hampered by anonymity on one hand
and summarised findings on the other.

Three Years Under the PIPEDA: A Disappointing Beginning

In short, the Privacy Commissioner’s policy with
respect to the identification of complaint respondents
lacks a strong, principled underpinning, and arguments
advanced in support of it do not stand up to scrutiny.
Moreover, there are a number of compelling arguments
that favour much greater disclosure, even if that does not
lead to the identification of the respondent in every case.
However, the indications from the Commissioner’s
office thus far suggest that if there is to be any movement
in this area, it is unlikely to be dramatic. 88 But at the
same time, one also senses that Commissioner Stoddart
is cognizant of the limitations arising from the statutory
framework, both in terms of the language of section 20
and with respect to the reliance on a ombudsman model
for oversight and enforcement, and this may well be
addressed in the report she will make in 2006 as part of
the five-year review of the legislation. 89 However, there
will be a great deal of water under the bridge by then,
and one senses that if there is not more significant movement on this issue, it will become all too apparent that
the legislation has little bite.
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Interpreting PIPEDA — How Long
Will it Take?

W

ith any new legislative regime, some time will be
required for the agency entrusted with oversight
and enforcement to flesh out the statutory language. It
may accomplish this primarily through the adjudication
of complaints, or in conjunction with development of
guidelines and rules, if the legislation permits. In most
instances, primary responsibility for interpreting the legislation’s core provisions resides with the agency, subject
of course to judicial review, the scope of which will
depend on the extent of privative protection that has
been extended to the agency’s decisions. However, until
the statutory language has been applied to specific situations, regulated parties will be uncertain about the scope
of their obligations and may delay investing resources in
compliance until the extent of those obligations is clear.
Under the PIPEDA, the element of uncertainty that
results from the inevitable delay in resolving such fundamental issues is exacerbated tremendously by a number
of factors. First is the very general nature of many of the
PIPEDA’s provisions, in particular the fair information
practices that have been imported as part of the Canadian Standards Association’s Model Code. Second, even
though the Privacy Commissioner is the primary oversight body on an ongoing basis, responsibility for
defining the statutory language resides essentially with
the Federal Court, 90 which will be involved, at most,
infrequently. Third, the PIPEDA puts in place a
mandatory two-step complaint process that requires the
complainant to obtain a report from the Commissioner
before being able to proceed to Federal Court. By
increasing cost 91 and delay, the process is likely to discourage complainants, thereby reducing the occasions in
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which the Federal Court will have an opportunity to
consider the legislation. In addition, the Federal Court
process itself invites delay, especially since definitive rulings on the PIPEDA’s provisions will undoubtedly
require a determination by the Federal Court of Appeal.
Taken together, these factors ensure that for quite some
time there will be considerable uncertainty about the
precise nature of the obligations that regulated parties
have under the Act. Several additional comments about
each of these points is necessary.
With respect to the general nature of many of the
PIPEDA’s provisions, there has always been debate about
the extent to which legislatures can and should define
standards more clearly. 92 That being said, the decision to
rely on the CSA Model Code with respect to many of the
PIPEDA’s substantive requirements means that the language used is more general and open-ended than would
often be the case. This takes on greater significance if the
primary means for fleshing out these standards is by way
of complaint adjudication. Not only will this be timeconsuming, but it will be haphazard, being dependent
on the nature and the number of complaints that are
received. If the complaints are few and the issues narrow,
this will greatly circumscribe the Commissioner’s ability
to generate useful jurisprudence. But even if complaints
do provide the Commissioner with the opportunity to
flesh out the statutory obligations, the directions charted
will remain highly uncertain until the Federal Court has
weighed in. 93 This takes us to the second point, which is
the unusual manner in which the PIPEDA has assigned
responsibility for interpreting the Act’s provisions.
As noted already, the Privacy Commissioner is given
primary responsibility for most activities relating to oversight and enforcement of the legislation. This includes
public education, research, and working with organizations to develop codes and guidelines that promote compliance with the Act. Implicit in this is that the Commissioner’s office will be the repository of significant privacy
expertise. However, when it comes to defining the
meaning of the Act’s core provisions, the Commissioner
is relegated essentially to the sidelines. Although a complainant must first go to the Commissioner, enforcement, like interpretation of the legislation, is ultimately
with the Federal Court. In fact, an application to the
court involves a full review on the merits with no special
significance being attached to the Commissioner’s investigation findings. 94
Even in a regime where responsibility for interpretation is given to the oversight agency and the courts purport to defer to the agency’s expertise, there is considerable room for intrusive judicial review to reshape the
contours of the legislation. 95 Under the PIPEDA, this is
magnified many times over, given that there a complete
separation between the accumulation of privacy-related
expertise and the interpretation of the legislative standards. Although the former ought to guide the latter, the
PIPEDA undercuts this connection. The courts may
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choose to defer to some extent to the Commissioner’s
investigation findings, but this is not required and is by
no means a given. 96 The result is that decisions emanating from the Federal Court could easily undermine
the Commissioner both in terms of complaint resolution
and broader compliance-focused initiatives. This leads to
uncertainty all around, for complainants, for the Commissioner’s office, and for the regulated community.

course, the Commissioner’s office has no choice but to
move ahead with its compliance initiatives. The problem
is that it cannot do so in confidence with the result that
its authority over non-compliant parties and its leadership with respect to the wider community are severely
undermined.

Finally, the mandatory two-step complaint process
aggravates matters by increasing the likelihood of cost
and delay for complainants. The Commissioner has up
to one year in which to issue a report dealing with a
complaint. If at that point the complainant is not satisfied with the outcome or if the respondent refuses to
implement the Commissioner’s recommendations, the
complainant can make an application to Federal Court.
However, as indicated already, this involves a full examination on the merits with the possibility of an appeal to
the Federal Court of Appeal. In practice, this means that
most complaints will not be resolved by the Federal
Court in anything less than two years. A good example is
provided by Case Summary #114, an important complaint by a member of the Canadian Auto Workers
(C.A.W.) about Canadian Pacific Railway’s use of electronic surveillance in the workplace. A complaint was
filed with the Commissioner’s office in January 2002,
and the Commissioner’s report was released in January 2003. 97 Although the complaint was upheld, the
Commissioner’s recommendations were not implemented and in February 2003, an application was made
to Federal Court for a hearing on the matter. The application was argued in April 2004, 14 months after the
proceeding was initiated, and a decision denying the
application was issued in June 2004. Even with the benefit of union counsel, it still took over two years to get
the matter heard in Federal Court and an appeal would
have prolonged matters even further. 98 While the C.A.W.
may have both the resources and the interest in pursuing
such a case, for most complainants this would be a
daunting prospect.

Conclusion

Not surprisingly, at this point, there have been relatively few applications to Federal Court and only three
cases decided on the merits. 99 At this rate, it could be
years before we have a good sense of how the legislation
will be shaped by the Federal Court. This does not bode
well from a compliance perspective. Those organizations
that are not committed to complying with the legislation
will have ample opportunity to delay and discourage
complainants. And, as indicated, the result is that fewer
complaints will get decided by the Federal Court,
thereby further delaying the interpretive process. Of

F

rom the very outset, the approach to oversight and
enforcement of the PIPEDA has been complaintfocused. This was clear from the thrust of the statute and
from the existing orientation of institutions charged with
oversight and enforcement. The emphasis on complaint
resolution was entrenched even further by strategic
choices made by the Privacy Commissioner’s office,
while statutory provisions providing proactive, systemic
compliance tools were scarcely employed. The result is
that compliance has been driven by an approach that
many privacy experts question, while methods that are
considered far more effective have been largely ignored.
In addition, the value of complaint resolution has been
further undermined by the decision to protect the identity of complaint respondents.
As a result of a number of factors, cost and delay
have now become significant considerations for complainants in particular, and uncertainty has become critically important for all parties. Although the initial decisions about oversight and enforcement impose structural
limits on the possibilities for change, there is considerable room for movement with respect to the emphasis
the Commissioner’s office decides to place on systemic
and proactive approaches to compliance. In this respect,
there are very strong signals that the Commissioner’s
office will be placing far greater emphasis on education,
guidance, and collaborative undertakings with provincial
counterparts and with the wider community. 100 That
being said, there is more that can be done, particularly to
increase transparency with respect to the investigation of
complaints and the identification of organizations that
deserve to be criticized or emulated. Even so, there is still
a fundamental issue with the pervasive uncertainty that
flows from the decision to give ultimate responsibility
for interpretation and enforcement to the Federal Court.
If matters do not improve, this should be a central point
of concern in the review of the legislation that takes
place two years hence. Revisiting this decision could
begin to address the PIPEDA’s critical oversight and
enforcement shortcomings — flaws that have become all
too apparent.
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(supra, note 11) and the Public Interest Advocacy Centre also wrote to
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In Englander (supra, note 91), the Court did suggest that the Commissioner’s report was entitled to ‘‘some deference’’ but did not elaborate. (At
para 39.) More recently, in Eastmond, (supra, note 90), the Court was
prepared to ‘‘. . . accord the Privacy Commissioner some deference in the
area of his expertise which would include appropriate recognition to the
factors he took into account in balancing the privacy interests of the
applicant and CP’s legitimate interest in protecting its employees and
property’’. (At para 122.) Unfortunately, neither decision discusses in any
detail the nature of the Commissioner’s expertise which would attract
judicial deference.
I am grateful to C.A.W. counsel Lewis Gottheil, who supplied this information and also provided a very helpful discussion of some of the issues
that were argued, including the standard of review that is appropriate for
the Commissioner’s decisions and the question of whether this type of
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held in L’Ecuyer v. Aeroports de Montreal (2003 FC 573).
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On May 18, 2004, Commissioner Stoddart spoke at a privacy session in
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and stressed that public education, working with her provincial counterparts and other affected organizations, and eliciting feedback from the
affected community would be some of the major areas of focus for her
office in the months ahead.

